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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Google’s initial public offering (IPO) revealed that the company would go public with a dual-class capitalization structure.1 A dual-class
stock company has a capital structure whereby insiders hold common stock
with multiple votes per share (typically ten), while the public holds common stock with just one vote per share.2 This structure was popular in the
1980s as a defensive measure to ensure that a company was protected against
hostile takeovers, management would adopt and keep high vote share
classes.3 The NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) and NYSE MKT LLC4
have consistently allowed corporations with such structures to list on their
exchanges,5 while the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has had different
rules over time.6 In 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
came into the picture and attempted to regulate companies with dual-class
stock (and other structures with shareholder voting restrictions) by
prohibiting such companies from listing on the stock exchange.7 However,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia subsequently vacated this
SEC rule.8 Today, corporations can list on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX
1
2

Google Inc., Registration Statement ( F orm S-1), at iii (Apr. 29, 2004).
Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1986).
3 Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-googlefounders-tighter-control.
4 NYSE MKT LLC was originally the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). AMEX was
acquired by NYSE Euronext in 2008 and is now rebranded as NYSE MKT LLC. See Press
Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext to Acquire the American Stock Exchange ( Jan. 17,
2008), http://nyse.com/press/1200568235016.html; see also Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE
Amex LLC to Be Renamed NYSE MKT LLC (May 10, 2012), http://www.nyse.com/
press/1336646911531.html; Press Release, NYSE Euronext, Rebranding of NYSE Alternext US to
NYSE Amex (Mar. 9, 2009), http://traderupdates.nyse.com/2009/03/rebranding_of_nyse_
alternext_u.html (explaining that AMEX was renamed NYSE Alternext US LLC after NYSE
Euronext’s acquisition).
5 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 692 (explaining that while the NASDAQ has considered
alternative proposals, it does not currently have an equal voting rights requirement); see also id. at
691 (explaining that as long as the common stock is voting, the AMEX may approve its listing
even if it only has the right to elect a minority of the board).
6 See id. at 692-93 (discussing the changes to the NYSE rules in the 1980s, and specifically
how dual class capitalization became permissible in 1986).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) (1989) (prohibiting the exchanges from listing, or continuing to
list, the securities of any issuer that “issues any class of security, or takes other corporate action,
with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights” of the
issuer’s existing stockholders).
8 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC
exceeded its authority in promulgating Rule 19c-4).
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as long as the dual-class structure was in place at the time of the initial
public offering.9
Since Google’s 2004 IPO, an increasing number of companies have begun to go public with similar capitalization structures.10 In light of dualclass stock’s resurgence, Congress and the stock exchanges should revisit the
use of such capitalization structures in the United States. In this Comment,
I argue that decoupling voting rights from economic ownership is detrimental to shareholders because it allows companies to avoid the threat of
market mechanisms that have traditionally served to keep management in
check. In the long term, this decoupling is incompatible with principles of
corporate governance, and thus stock exchanges should reevaluate their
policy of accepting companies with dual-class stock structures. Part I
discusses how the dual-class structure allows management to entrench itself
and effectively prevent shareholders from exercising any sort of control over
a company they technically own. Part II explains how dual-class stock
companies have led to both stock unifications that are detrimental to the
general public and controllers extracting benefits for themselves in acquisitions. Finally, Part III discusses how such reforms can be achieved.
I. WHY DUAL-CLASS STOCK IS DETRIMENTAL TO SHAREHOLDERS
While there are legitimate reasons why dual-class stock can be beneficial
for a company and its shareholders, on balance, such structures are undesirable. Management should not be able to enjoy the benefits of controlling a
public company while ignoring the voice of its shareholders.
A. Dual-Class Stock Companies Have Inadequate Checks on Management
One of the strongest arguments in support of the dual-class structure is
that management can more easily set long-term goals and innovate.11 The
9 See NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market Rules IM-5640 (2014), available at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/Main (“Companies with existing dual class capital
structures would generally be permitted to issue additional shares of the existing super voting
stock without conflict with this policy.”); NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 313.1 (2014) [hereinafter NYSE Manual], available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM
(same); NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE MKT LLC Company Guide § 122.01 (2014), available at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEX/CompanyGuide (same).
10 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 8 (Feb. 1, 2012); Groupon,
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 120 ( June 2, 2011); LinkedIn Corp., Registration
Statement (Form S-1/A), at 116 ( Jan. 27, 2011); Zynga Inc., Amended Registration Statement
(Form S-1), at 137 (Dec. 9, 2011).
11 See, e.g., Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Letter from the Founders, WALL S T. J. (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB108326432110097510 (explaining that, in implementing its

1498

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1495

structure allows “founding entrepreneurs or family members access to the
equity markets without diluting control.”12 For example, at the time Google
went public, holders of Class A stock—public shareholders—were entitled
to one vote per share;13 holders of Class B stock—Executive Chairman Eric
Schmidt and founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin—were entitled to ten
votes per share.14 This meant that, while the Class B stock comprised only
31.3% of total shares outstanding, Google executives—Schmidt, Page, and
Brin—collectively held 66.2% of shareholders’ total voting power.15 While
dual-class proponents may argue that such figures have little effect on
governance as long as the company has “terrific management, an engaged
board of directors, and a strong governance culture,”16 this imbalance in
voting rights between management and public shareholders eliminates the
market checks on managerial misconduct on which shareholders of singleclass companies rely.
One of the primary focuses of corporate governance is to monitor possible mismanagement or self-dealing by those in control of the corporation.17
However, because publicly traded corporations are owned by a large number
of widely dispersed shareholders, there is no single shareholder to monitor
the corporation. In their oft-cited work, Berle and Means identified this
phenomenon as the “[s]eparation of ownership and control.”18 This collective action problem has led to the traditional conception of corporate
governance, whereby the shareholders’ role is to elect the board of directors,
which in turn performs the monitoring function and selects the officers
(e.g., CEOs and CFOs) who run the corporation.19
In a company with dual-class stock, however, the mechanism for board
oversight does not function as it should because the CEO—the largest

dual-class structure, Google “implemented a corporate structure that is designed to protect
Google’s ability to innovate”).
12 Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 884 (1994).
13 Elinor Mills, Google to Defend Dual-Class Stock Structure, CNET NEWS (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://news.cnet.com/Google-to-defend-dual-class-stock-structure/2100-1030_ 3 -6060691.html.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 James Kristie, Dual-Class Stock: Governance at the Edge, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Third
Quarter 2012, at 40 (summarizing the remarks of David L. Cohen, Executive Vice President of
Comcast, a dual-class stock company).
17
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & J AMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (10th ed. 2011).
18 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN C ORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1933).
19 See id. at 86-87.
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shareholder—effectively selects the board.20 If directors can be fired by a
single person or family, they will be impeded from exercising the fiduciary
duties that they owe to all shareholders. 21 For example, when Google
recently approved the issuance of nonvoting stock that further concentrated
control in the hands of its founders, the board of directors unanimously
approved the measure.22 Even though the directors met sixteen times to
deliberate, “[t]he only likely alternative to voting ‘yes’ would have been to
resign and explain why [they] voted ‘no.’ Or they most likely would not have
found their names on the board nomination list next year.”23 When the top
directors and the largest shareholders are one and the same, it is unrealistic
to expect the board dutifully to make decisions that are beneficial to shareholders as a whole.
Furthermore, when voting rights are not proportional to the economic
interests of the shareholders, controllers can easily obtain private benefits
while imposing disproportionate costs on the broader shareholder base.24
However, shareholders are not the only ones disproportionately affected—
when these structures lead to less board accountability, the monitoring
function of boards will be transferred to third parties (e.g., the courts, the
regulators, and the government), and the public will be forced to bear these
costs.25 For example, Reader’s Digest Association (RDA) had a dual-class
structure that was controlled by two not-for-profit philanthropic foundations created by its founders.26 These not-for-profits, driven by a need to
fund their own projects, pushed the company toward a policy that
eventually led RDA to issue dividends in excess of cash flows.27 Michael
Geltzeiler, who served as the company’s CFO at the time, noted that the
interests of the controlling shareholders were not aligned with those of the
other shareholders.28 While investors generally want the board to determine
what is in the best interest of all shareholders in order to create the most
20 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 39 (summarizing the remarks of Geoff Colvin, Senior Editorat-Large for Fortune magazine).
21 See id. at 38 (summarizing the remarks of Ann Yerger, Executive Director of the Council of
Institutional Investors).
22 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Stock Split for Google that Cements Control at the Top, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/stock-split-for-google-thatcements-control-at-the-top.
23 Id.
24 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 44 (summarizing the remarks of Vice Chancellor John Noble).
25 Id. at 38 (summarizing the remarks of Charles Elson, Director of the Weinberg Center for
Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware).
26 Id. at 42 (summarizing the comments of Michael S. Geltzeiler, Executive Vice President
and CFO of NYSE Euronext).
27 Id.
28 Id.
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long-term value, “[t]hat can become more difficult in a dual-class structure
if one party views the firm not as the public’s company but as their business,
one that they own.”29
To further exacerbate the problem of inadequate checks on management,
dual-class companies that fall under the definition of a “controlled company” do not have to comply with NYSE governance rules 303A.01, 303A.04,
and 303A.05.30 Rule 303A.01 requires listed companies to have a majority of
independent directors on the board,31 Rule 303A.04 requires listed companies to have nominating and corporate governance committees composed
entirely of independent directors, 32 and Rule 303A.05 requires listed
companies to have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.33 Independent directors, a particular focus of corporategovernance reforms post-Enron, ensure that corporate officers do not abuse
their authority or shirk their responsibilities.34 At least in theory, directors’
independence prevents managers from engaging in self-dealing and allows
them to objectively oversee managerial decisionmaking. 35 While the exchanges were required to adopt such rules in accordance with the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act,36 companies are exempt from these requirements as long as they
qualify as a controlled company—“[a] listed company of which more than
50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company.”37 Therefore, even if managers in dual-class
stock companies do not have more than a fifty-percent economic interest in
the company, by virtue of their voting power, they are entitled to do away
with these shareholder safeguards.

29
30

Id. at 43.
See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 9, § 303A.00 (excepting controlled companies from the
requirements of section 303A).
31 Id. § 303A.01.
32 Id. § 303A.04.
33 Id. § 303A.05.
34 See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine, The Independent Director: A Key Sarbanes Legacy, NYSE,
https://www.boardmember.com/the-independent-director-a-key-sarbanes-legacy.aspx (last visited
Apr. 18, 2014) (noting that Sarbanes–Oxley Act “significantly expanded” the importance of
independent directors).
35 Id. (“Effective corporate governance is perceived as a byproduct of attentive, independent
board members focused on the best interests of the organization they serve, and its underlying
business mission.”).
36 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
37 NYSE MANUAL , supra note 9, § 303A.00.
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B. Dual-Class Stock Structures Facilitate Managerial Entrenchment
In addition to weakening market mechanisms for management oversight,
the dual-class stock structure can also be used to facilitate managerial
entrenchment.38 As Vice Chancellor Noble explains, even though the two
structures may seem similar, a company with dual-class stock is different
from a company with a large majority shareholder because at least the large
shareholder in a single-class company holds a proportionate economic
interest.39 Having a proportionate economic interest is desirable because a
market-oriented approach is the optimal way to lower agency costs.40 For
example, if the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis41 holds, a drop in the
stock value would signal to shareholders that a company is being poorly
managed.42 Lower share prices may therefore encourage shareholders to
mount proxy challenges to replace current management or lead to bids to
buy the corporation (which often results in the replacement of the incumbent board of directors). However, in a dual-class company, where the
controller’s voting power outweighs his economic interest, “[c]oncerns about
proxy fights, losing votes at the shareholders’ meetings, simply aren’t a real
consideration.”43 Therefore, by having dual-class shares, management can
insulate itself from corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market
for corporate control or monitoring by noncontrolling shareholders.44
When investors buy common stock in a company with dual-class stock,
they are essentially betting on the management of the company to create
value,45 but when the interests of controlling management diverge with
shareholder interests, there is not much a shareholder can do. For example,
when Groupon’s shares fell fifteen percent after its auditor found “material
weakness in the company’s internal controls,” shareholders could not
38 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 38 (summarizing the remarks of Ann Yerger) (“[D]ual-class
stock is created with short-term thinking in mind, because [it] is really about entrenching
leaders . . . at the expense of the company’s long term.”).
39 Kristie, supra note 16, at 44 (summarizing the remarks of Vice Chancellor John Noble).
40 See generally EISENBERG & COX, supra note 17.
41 The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis asserts that investors in the stock market react
quickly and efficiently to information, and that only new information will change the value of a
company’s shares. This hypothesis would suggest that the share price in an efficient market reflects
how well a corporation is run. Id.
42 EISENBERG & COX, supra note 17, at 59 (citing Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers,
and Franklin Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 314, 329-33 (10th ed. 2011)).
43 Kristie, supra note 16, at 44 (summarizing the remarks of Vice Chancellor John Noble).
44 See Henrik Cronqvist & Mattias Nilsson, Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders,
38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 695, 715 (2003) (analyzing Swedish firms and finding
that “firms with [controlling stockholders] are much less likely to be taken over compared to other
firms”).
45 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 42 (summarizing the remarks of Michael S. Geltzeiler).
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demand that the board replace the CFO or CEO (who was a music student
just three years prior to assuming his position) since the founders, including
the CEO, retained majority voting control.46 As one commentator put it,
once the founders stop being visionaries, or control is passed to another
generation of leadership, management “won’t have the kick in the pants that
the prospect of pressure from shareholders can provide.” 47 This is why
Rupert and James Murdoch, even after being implicated in a criminal
investigation for phone-hacking, were able to retain their positions as the
heads of News Corp.48 Despite substantial noncontrolling shares being cast
in favor of replacing them on the board of directors, their own votes were
enough to secure their positions.49
In a dual-class company, shareholder protection is limited to disclosure,
common law fiduciary duties imposed on directors, and public pressures
such as shaming.50 Efforts to change the dual-class structure once it is no
longer beneficial to shareholders can be futile, because by definition, the
shareholders lack the requisite votes to effect such a change. For example, in
1999, when CalPERS attempted to end the dual-class structure at Tyson
Foods, its push was “defeated by the Tyson family’s supervote.”51
Allowing management to entrench itself is counter to public policy and
has been cited as a critical concern in classic corporate law cases such as
Schnell52 and Portnoy.53 The fact that dual-class stock structures facilitate
managerial entrenchment further suggests that companies with such
structures should not be permitted to list on the exchanges.
46 Therese Poletti, IPO Investors: Beware the Dual-Class Stock, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 5,
2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-04-05/commentary/31288299_1_groupon-stock-bradkeywell-eric-lefkofsky.
47 Sorkin, supra note 22.
48 See Richard Blackden, Rupert Murdoch’s Iron Grip on News Corp Dealt a Blow, TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/
9613863/Rupert-Murdochs-iron-grip-on-News-Corp-dealt-a-blow.html.
49 See id.
50 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 44 (summarizing the remarks of Vice Chancellor John Noble).
51 Bill Mann, Dual-Class Shares, Second-Class Investors, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 14, 2004),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2004/04/14/dualclass-shares-secondclass-investors.aspx.
52 See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ( f inding that management’s attempt to “utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of
perpetuating itself in office” was an “inequitable purpose, contrary to established principles of
corporate democracy”).
53 See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 47 (Del. Ch. 2008) (setting aside the results
of a contested election after finding that the CEO’s “use . . . of corporate resources and fiduciary
authority” was motivated by her desire to keep her corporate office); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding that management’s attempt to “utilize the corporate
machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office . . . may not be
permitted to stand”).
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C Dual-Class Stock Companies Do Not Benefit from
Institutional Investor Monitoring
Ownership of a company’s stock by institutional investors may push
companies to improve their governance mechanisms,54 thereby benefiting
even dispersed shareholders. However, there are signs that many institutional investors are beginning to shift their investments away from companies with dual-class stock. In one study, institutional ownership in dual-class
firms was found to be substantially lower than it was in comparable singleclass firms.55 In 2006, Morgan Stanley Investment Management urged the
board of the New York Times, a dual-class company controlled primarily by
the Ochs–Sulzberger family, to end the company’s dual-class structure.56 In
a press release, the investment company noted that, “[w]hile it may have at
one time been designed to protect the editorial independence and the
integrity of the news franchise, the dual-class voting structure now fosters a
lack of accountability to all of the company’s shareholders.” 57 After its
efforts ultimately failed, Morgan Stanley sold its 7.2% stake.58 Furthermore,
in 2012, CalPERS, the largest pension fund in the United States, began to
campaign for the removal of dual-class voting structures; it is currently in
the process of reevaluating whether to invest in IPOs that use them.59

54 See, e.g., C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95
J. FIN. ECON. 356, 380 (2010) ( f inding that “institutional investors are more resourceful and
motivated” to achieve favorable litigation outcomes and that “defendant firms with institutional
lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in corporate governance subsequent to the lawsuit
filing”).
55 Marcia Millon Cornett & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Voting Rights and Shareholder Wealth: The
Issuance of Limited Voting Common Stock, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 186 (1989);
Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership, 46 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 247, 270 (2011) (hypothesizing that, in the 1990s, “institutional
investors might have voted with their feet by selling shares of firms with poor governance and
buying shares of companies with good corporate governance”).
56 Morgan Stanley Challenges N.Y. Times Ownership Structure, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2006),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/2006-11-08-ny-times-ownership_x.htm?csp=34.
57 Press Release, Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., Calls for Elimination of Dual-Class Capital Structure to Enable All Shareholders to Hold Board of Directors and Management Accountable for Company’s Performance (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20060418005896/en/MSIMs-Global-Franchise-Investment-Program-AnnouncesWithhold.
58 See Louis Hau, Two-Tier Ownership Prevails, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.forbes.com/
2007/10/17/nyt-morgan-sale-biz-media-cx_lh_1017biznyt.html.
59 See Shanny Basar, CalPERS Sets Sights on Dual-Class Stock Structures, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443855804577601271252759472.html (reporting that
CalPERS “is threatening to boycott any stock-market listing that allows minority shareholders to
control a majority of the votes through multitier share structures”).
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The departure of large institutional investors from companies with dualclass stock may be especially detrimental since those investors play a large
role in overseeing management and overcoming the collective action
problem that results from an otherwise dispersed group of shareholders. In
the past, shareholders who were dissatisfied with their investment would sell
their shares rather than try to influence corporate behavior (the “Wall
Street Rule”). 60 However, the modern trend is for these institutional
investors to become more active in the corporations whose shares they
own.61 Institutional investors seek to influence corporate decisions by using
their voting power, meeting with managers, and exerting pressure for
change on independent directors. 62 For example, one study found that
institutional investors were instrumental in defending the public’s interest
in unifications of dual-class stock; they helped lower the compensation that
majority shareholders were able to extract from the company for their vote
loss.63
D. Pricing of Dual-Class Stock
Proponents of the dual-class structure further argue that such structures
are not detrimental because only those who invest in dual-class stock
companies could potentially be harmed. 64 They assert that, because the
dual-class structure is disclosed when a company goes public, the limited
rights associated with the stock will be reflected in its IPO price, which will
be discounted accordingly. 65 Moreover, proponents argue that investors
should price the cost of having fewer voting rights when determining

60 See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 17, at 304 (“[U]ntil twenty to thirty years ago, the role
of shareholders in publicly held corporations was largely one of extreme passivity.”).
61 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811, 828-29 (1992) (discussing the rise in institutional activism, including placing
institutional representatives on corporate boards).
62 See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 17, at 304-05 (noting the various forms that shareholder activism can take).
63 Shmuel Hauser & Beni Lauterbach, The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders:
Evidence from Dual-Class Stock Unifications, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 1167, 1183 (2004); see also infra
Section II.A.
64 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 37-38 (summarizing the remarks of Charles Elson, Director of
the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware).
65 See Ashton, supra note 12, at 868 (explaining that “in an IPO[,] the purchasing shareholder
suffers no real economic loss” because “the value of the vote will be discounted and reflected in the
price on which the buyer and seller have agreed”). For example, when Google went public with the
structure in 2004, it contained an explicit warning in its filing documents regarding the structure.
Kristie, supra note 16, at 38.
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whether or not to buy into the IPO; if they do not like the bargain, they can
always choose not to invest.66
However, while investors, in theory, can always choose not to participate
in an IPO, other factors may induce them to make an otherwise irrational
choice. For example, as Institutional Shareholder Services points out,
Facebook’s recent IPO presented a “Hobson’s choice”67: investors either had
to accept Facebook’s governance structure—which included dual-class stock
and other provisions that “diminish[ed] shareholder rights and board
accountability”—or otherwise miss out on what at the time seemed like “one
of the hottest business models of the internet age.”68 The Facebook scenario
is not uncommon: Scott Goebel of Fidelity revealed that, while Fidelity
generally opposes the adoption of dual-class structures, it “nevertheless
regularly invest[s] in dual-class companies” because they might, for example, have compelling businesses.69 Similarly, when LinkedIn went public
with a variety of mechanisms that would leave control largely in the hands
of its founder, one observer noted that it was doing so likely because “it
[could] get away with it, particularly since [it would] be a hot I.P.O.” and
institutional investors who typically buy at the IPO stage plan to flip their
shares anyway.70
Moreover, the proponents’ argument that investors are only getting what
they voluntarily bargained for is undermined by the possibility that these
stocks are not properly discounted at the time of the IPO. While underwriters serve the function of gatekeepers in evaluating whether an IPO is
appropriate for the public market, their gatekeeping function has grown
weak in recent years.71 Banks have become “captive[s] of the issuers,” and
can dilute any reputational losses from underwriting poor stock by sharing
the burden with multiple banks.72
To make matters worse, underwriters may work with issuers to obscure
investors’ access to relevant information. For example, eleven days prior to
66 See id.
67 INSTITUTIONAL

S’HOLDER SERVS., THE TRAGEDY OF THE DUAL CLASS COMMONS 1
(Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf.
68 Id.
69 See Kristie, supra note 16, at 39-40 (summarizing the remarks of Scott Goebel, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of Fidelity Management & Research Co.).
70 Steven M. Davidoff, Plans for LinkedIn’s I.P.O. May Make Few Friends, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 10, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/plans-for-linkedins-i-p-omay-make-few-friends.
71 See Steven M. Davidoff, After Years Without Change, Cracks Appear in I.P.O. Process, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK ( J une 14, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/after-years-withoutchange-cracks-appear-in-i-p-o-process.
72 Id.
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the launch of Facebook’s IPO, Facebook discovered that its revenue growth
was not as high as it expected.73 To deal with the “nearly unprecedented
last-minute correction” in its revenue projections,74 Facebook and its lead
underwriter, Morgan Stanley, decided to do two things: (1) file an amendment to its registration statement; and (2) “call research analysts with much
more specific information about the company’s weakening projections.”75
This new information regarding revenue growth was embedded on three
pages of a 170-page document and was worded in such a way that “[e]ven
the most sophisticated retail investors, armed with a software bot that could
comb the new [registration statement] for updates, could not have read what
research analysts at [various investment banks] would learn later that
evening: That Facebook . . . was slashing its annual projections.”76 Facebook’s Vice President of Finance also made calls to research desks at
Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, and Goldman Sachs, causing each bank to
lower their estimates of Facebook’s annual revenue by 3.01% to 3.33%.77 The
upshot of all this was that institutional investors acted on the slashed
revenue projections—many made “huge profits betting against the company” while “others avoided major losses by backing out of the IPO just in
time78—while individual investors, left in the dark, saw Facebook’s value
plummet, taking their investments with it.79
Given the potentially widened investor base from these “hot” IPOs,80
one is forced to question whether shareholders and investors truly have the
ability to accurately assess the value of a dual-class stock at the time of the
IPO. It is likely that many investors make their purchase decisions in order
to avoid losing out on a widely hyped opportunity. Simultaneously, companies may be opportunistically exploiting this hot demand to force investors
73 Khadeeja Safdar, Facebook, One Year Later: What Really Happened in the Biggest IPO Flop
Ever, ATLANTIC (May 20, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05/facebookone-year-later-what-really-happened-in-the-biggest-ipo-flop-ever/275987
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. (telling the story of one woman who used her late husband’s 401(k) retirement account
to invest in Facebook stock and lost $36,000 by the second day of trading); see also, e.g., In re
Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 288 F.R.D. 26, 30 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (consolidating nearly thirty securities actions against Facebook in connection with its IPO).
80 See Michael Giles, Facebook IPO Will Bring a Whole New Generation to the Stock Market,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-giles/facebookipo_b_1290659.html (“[W]ith over 850 million active users around the world, Facebook’s IPO will
reignite interest in the stock market for young adults who had previously abandoned investing . . .
[and] will encourage a whole new generation to start investing for the first time . . . .”).
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to buy shares in a company with a capital structure they might otherwise
avoid. Such behavior will harm shareholders in the long run.
E. Companies Are Turning to the United States for Its Soft Regulation
Another reason that the exchanges should reevaluate their policy on allowing the listing of dual-class stock companies is the fact that dual-class
stock companies are now turning to the United States to launch their IPOs.
For example, in 2012, Manchester United, the English soccer team, filed to
go public in the United States with a dual-class structure.81 Its decision was
driven by the fact that the London Stock Exchange does not allow dualclass structures, and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange “would not give the
team a waiver to allow two classes of shares, with different voting rights.”82
Moreover, because the team benefited from the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act,83 it did not face the same hurdles as many U.S.
businesses do when filing for an IPO. The JOBS Act lessens the regulatory
and reporting requirements for IPOs of “emerging growth companies,”
defined as companies with annual gross revenues of less than one billion
dollars during the most recent fiscal year.84 In addition to allowing for
private submission of IPO registration statements, 85 emerging growth
companies are exempt from, among other things, the internal controls audit
required by Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404(b),86 and the requirement to hold
shareholder advisory votes and disclose information on executive compensation that would otherwise be required of a public company.87 An emerging
growth company can benefit from these loosened restrictions until the first
fiscal year in which its revenues exceed one billion dollars, or the first fiscal
year after the fifth year following its IPO.88
Moreover, because Manchester United also qualified as a “foreign private issuer” under Rule 405 of the Securities Act, it was able to avail itself
of additional loosened restrictions. 89 For example, while foreign private
81 Steven M. Davidoff, In Manchester United’s I.P.O., a Preference for American Rules, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK ( July 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/in-manchester-unitedsi-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules.
82 Id.
83 Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
84 Id. § 101.
85 Id. § 106(a).
86 Id. § 103.
87 Id. § 102(a).
88 Id. § 101.
89 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2013) (“Once an issuer qualifies as a foreign private issuer, it will
immediately be able to use the forms and rules designated for foreign private issuers until it fails
to qualify for this status . . . .”).
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issuers must still file annual reports with the SEC, they are not required to
provide, among other things, quarterly financial information (Form 10-Q
for domestic companies) or proxy solicitation materials (Schedule 14A or
14C for domestic companies).90
Other companies are following in Manchester United’s footsteps. According to The Wall Street Journal, eight out of nine Chinese companies that
went public in the United States in 2013 adopted a structure whereby
“insiders have influence beyond their economic stakes”; in March of 2014,
Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba and China’s version of Twitter, Weibo,
both announced plans to file for U.S. IPOs.91 Alibaba was initially set to
launch its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange but changed its mind
when the Hong Kong authorities would not allow it to use a structure that
allows leading executives to nominate a majority of board directors.92 On
one hand, attracting new companies to list in the United States could bring
potential economic benefits. On the other hand, however, we should be
wary of the potentially disastrous consequences of welcoming companies
that are listing in the United States solely to avoid their home countries’
regulations or to avoid having to disclose information to investors.
Other countries have already made the move toward eliminating dualclass structures on exchanges. Countries such as South Korea, India, and
Russia now only allow a one-vote, one-share structure. 93 Moreover, in
Western European countries where dual-class structures are permitted,
certain rules seek to minimize the effect of differential voting rights.94 For
example, in Sweden, the government established a maximum voting
disparity of ten to one and implemented protections for noncontrolling
shareholders, such as “membership on the board nominations committee for
90 See Nilene R. Evans, Thomas A. Humphreys & Neeraj Kumar, Frequently Asked Questions
About Foreign Private Issuers, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 4, 12 (2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/100521FAQForeignPrivate.pdf.
91 Liz Hoffman & Telis Demos, Easier Rules Lure Foreign Firms to List in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Mar.
21, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304026304579449702968537802
(explaining that “looser corporate-governance standards are luring foreign companies to U.S.
markets” and that companies, such as Weibo, will qualify as foreign-private issuers).
92 Paul J. Davies & Arash Massoudi, Alibaba Abandons $60bn Hong Kong Listing, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/525f4bc2-25ae-11e3-aee8-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2ynM4VOw8 (noting that corporate governance experts in Hong Kong supported the
Exchange’s decision and characterized Alibaba’s efforts as an attempt to “bully” the Exchange
away from the “tradition of one share, one vote”).
93 Simon C.Y. Wong, Google’s Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship,
HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/04/googles_stocksplit_plan_would.html.
94 Id. (“In recent years, the trend globally has been to eliminate or reduce the severity of
multiple share classes in order to loosen the grip of dominant shareholders.”).
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a firm’s top 3-4 shareholders and a 90% shareholder-approval threshold (by
economic interests) for any proposal to issue equity to executives and
related parties.”95 It is time for the United States to follow these countries
in disallowing dual-class structures on the stock exchanges.
F. Dual-Class Stock Structures Are Unnecessary
Dual-class stock structures exacerbate potential agency problems in
companies that have already incorporated sufficient antitakeover mechanisms. For example, LinkedIn drew criticisms that it had the potential to
turn into a “corporate governance nightmare” when it went public with a
dual-class structure, bylaw notice provisions intended to discourage shareholder activism, and a staggered board.96 Further, its charter specifies that
the staggered board can only be repealed by an eighty-percent shareholder
vote—an “almost impossible threshold” given that charter amendments
must be proposed by the board, which would have little incentive to amend
this rule.97 Given these antitakeover protections, the dual-class structure,
whereby the controlling shareholders have ten–to-one voting power, was
unnecessary.98 In this case, public shareholders had less than one percent of
the voting power in LinkedIn after the IPO, while cofounder and Chairman, Reid Hoffman, controlled the company with three venture capital
shareholders.99
Similarly, Facebook’s charter provisions are more than sufficient to protect the company from hostile takeovers without the dual-class structure.
Facebook has a staggered board, a “blank check” provision that can be used
to put in a poison pill and a provision that prohibits action by shareholder
consent without a meeting.100 In contrast, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
can take action as a shareholder without any stockholder meeting or prior
notice,101 and he can designate his successor in the event he still controls the

95
96

Id.
Steven M. Davidoff, A Deeper Look at LinkedIn’s Structure, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May
12, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/a-deeper-look-at-linkedins-structure.
97 Id. Staggered boards are “powerful antitakeover device[s] because it [would take] two years
to replace a majority of the board.” Id.
98 Steven M. Davidoff, Plans for LinkedIn’s I.P.O. May Make Few Friends, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 10, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/plans-for-linkedins-i-p-omay-make-few-friends.
99 Id.
100 Ronald Barusch, At Facebook, Governance = Zuckerberg, WALL S T. J. ( F eb. 1, 2012), http://
blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/02/01/at-facebook-governance-zuckerberg.
101 Id.
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company at the time of his death.102 Finally, when gaming company Zynga
went public, it created an unprecedented three-tier stock structure whereby
the CEO would have shares with seventy times the voting power of public
investors.103 All of these companies already have sufficient takeover protection without having to resort to the dual-class stock structure.
G. Dual-Class Stock Companies Have Continued to
Decouple Voting and Economic Power
Companies have now begun to take further advantage of the dual-class
structure to increase their control. In 2012, Google’s cofounders announced
that the company would create a class of nonvoting shares that would be
issued as a part of employee stock incentive plans, acquisitions, and other
stock sales.104 The reaction to the announcement was generally unfavorable,105 yet there is little that shareholders can do to effect change in this
policy.106 This issuance of stock would further concentrate ownership of the
company in Executive Chairman Schmidt, and cofounders Page and Brin.107
Given the wave of dual-class IPOs that followed Google after its IPO in
2004,108 it may only be a matter of time before other companies also begin
to utilize such measures to further cement their control.
II. UNIFICATIONS AND ACQUISITIONS
Experiences of companies that have had dual-class structures are particularly illustrative of why such structures can be detrimental to shareholders’
102 Douglas MacMillan, Zuckerberg Controlling 57% of Facebook Seen as Risk to Investors,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK ( F eb. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
zuckerberg-controlling-57-of-facebook-seen-as-risk-to-investors-02022012.html.
103 Id. Zynga’s other antitakeover provisions included noncumulative voting rights, which
would allow stockholders with a majority of the voting power to elect the Company’s entire board
of directors. Id.
104 Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-givesgoogle-founders-tighter-control.
105 See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 22 (“[T]he entire point of the stock split was to solidify the
founders’ control of the company by diminishing the future voting power of the shareholders.”);
Brian Womack, Google Stock Plan Irks Governance Watchdogs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr.
13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-13/google-stock-plan-irks-governance-watchdogs
(noting that Google’s stock declined 4.1% following the announcement).
106 See Womack, supra note 105 (suggesting that shareholders have limited power in Google’s
decisionmaking and proposing that the real solution to their discontent is to sell their shares).
107 See id.
108 James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/
talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki (recognizing LinkedIn, Groupon, Yelp, and
Zynga as examples of technology companies that adopted dual-class structures after Google).
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interests. In this Part, I discuss the effect of the dual-class stock structure in
two contexts—stock unifications and acquisitions.
A. Unifications
When companies with dual-class stock fail or are underperforming, investors might call for the company to unify its two classes of stock.109 In
fact, a shareholder proposal for a recapitalization plan that gives one vote
per share of all outstanding stock is already on the agenda for Facebook’s
second annual meeting.110 Those who support the dual-class stock structure
argue that the structure does not have permanent implications on the
governance of a firm and can easily be changed; however, when management does in fact decide to end the dual-class stock structure and unify the
two classes into one single stock, it can be against the public shareholders’
interests, and is often anything but easy.
For example, RDA, which went public in 1990 with dual-class shares,
decided to unwind the dual-class structure in 2002.111 The company initially
proposed paying $100 million to the trust funds that owned the Class B
supervoting stock in exchange for converting to the newly issued common
stock at one vote per share.112 This decision was controversial and eventually
led to litigation in the Delaware Supreme Court.113 The Court held that the
Special Committee in charge of the recapitalization process only considered
the fairness of the payment to RDA as a whole, but not the specific impact
on the Class A shareholders who would also hold the single-vote common

109 For example, in 2006, Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Pension Fund informed
Google that it would submit a shareholder proposal urging shareholders to adopt a recapitalization
plan. Mills, supra note 13. Similarly, Comcast faced such calls from investors to eliminate its dual-class
stock structure. See Investor Calls for Ouster of Comcast Chief, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 18, 2008),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/investor-calls-for-ouster-of-comcast-chief (noting shareholder
proposals opposing Comcast’s supervoting structure which allowed the chief executive’s family to
have thirty-three-percent voting power with only a one-percent economic stake). For a discussion
of the New York Times shareholder proposal to end its dual-class structure, see supra notes 56-58
and accompanying text.
110 Jennifer Van Grove, At Annual Meeting, Facebook Stockholders to Propose Changes, CNET
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/at-annual-meeting-facebook-stockholders-topropose-changes; see also Pamela Park, Corporate Governance Watch: Recent No-Action Letters Show
Continued Focus on Dual-Class Structures, BUS. L. CURRENTS, Dec. 30, 2013, available at 2013
WLNR 32554846 (describing shareholder attempts to call for recapitalization plans at various
corporations).
111 Kristie, supra note 16, at 42 (summarizing the comments of Michael S. Geltzeiler).
112 See Levco Alt. Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 466,2002, 2002 WL 1859064, at *1
(Del. Aug. 13, 2002).
113 See id.
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stock after the recapitalization.114 As a result of the Court’s ruling, the
original recapitalization plan was terminated and a new agreement was
negotiated.115 Ultimately, the Class B stockholders received $100 million in
the process, as in the original plan, and Class B stock was exchanged at a
ratio of 1.22 shares of Class B stock to one share of common stock.116
Similarly, Frank Stronach of Canadian company Magna International
was severely criticized for obtaining fifty-two million dollars in consulting
fees and six million dollars from stock options in compensation, even
though Magna’s stock price had fallen thirty percent in the previous year.117
When Magna eventually decided to end its dual-class structure, Stronach
managed to extract nearly one billion dollars (an 1800% premium) from the
company in exchange for giving up control.118
Finally, when restaurant chain Benihana’s dual-class structure led to half
a decade of proxy contests and boardroom struggles,119 the board proposed a
restructuring that would collapse both classes of stock into a single class at a
one-for-one exchange ratio. 120 The proposal effectively eliminated the
market premium of the common stock, which had carried with it voting
control, and transferred value from the common shareholders to the Class A
common shareholders.121
Announcements for unifications are generally met with higher stock
prices, signaling that the market believes that such unifications are beneficial to shareholders in the long run. However, as these examples show, in
the short term, public shareholders are forced to finance that unification
with costly litigation and excessively large premiums.

114
115

Id. at *2-3.
See Reader’s Digest Completes Recapitalization to One Share-One Vote Structure, PR NEWSWIRE
(Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Reader’s+Digest+Completes+Recapitalization+to+
One+Share-One+Vote...-a0132148779 (discussing the terms of the new October 15th recapitalization agreement).
116 Id.
117 Michel Magnan & Samer Khalil, Dual-Class Shares: Governance, Risks, and Rewards, IVEY
BUS. J. (May–June 2007), available at http://iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/leadership/dual-classshares-governance-risks-and-rewards.
118 Court Approves Magna Payment to Stronach, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/magna-payment-to-stronach-approved; see also INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 67, at 3.
119 Benihana’s capitalization structure was rather unique because the Class A common shares,
with one-tenth vote per share, were mostly owned by the company’s directors, executives, and
large minority shareholders. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 67, at 2. The
Common shares, on the other hand, were the “supervoting” shares; they had one vote per share
and were publicly traded (although they were mostly owned by the founder’s family trust). Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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B. Mergers and Acquisitions
Controlling shareholders can also realize a significant premium for their
shares in the context of mergers and acquisitions. For example, when
Affiliated Computer Services was acquired, Darwin Deason, the Chairman,
negotiated a $300 million premium for his Class B shares.122 The Affiliated
Computer Services deal led to the inclusion of “fair-price” clauses in
charters of dual-class stock companies, which require all shares to be
purchased at an equal price in the case of a takeover.123
However, even with such a provision in place, shareholders are still at
risk in takeovers. This point was made clear in the 2012 case, In re Delphi
Financial Group Shareholder Litigation.124 In Delphi, the company’s founder,
Robert Rosenkranz, possessed 49.9% of the voting power while holding only
12.9% of the equity.125 Rosenkranz achieved this by distributing Class A
common stock to the public, while retaining the Class B common stock,
with ten-to-one voting rights.126 While a control block is usually entitled to
a control premium, Rosenkranz bargained away that premium by inserting a
charter provision that prohibited disparate consideration between Class A
and Class B stock in the event of a merger.127
In 2011, Tokio Marine Holdings (TMH) approached Rosenkranz about
the possible purchase of Delphi. 128 Throughout discussions regarding a
potential merger, Rosenkranz represented Delphi with assistance from
Delphi’s COO and CFO, and Rosenkranz began to consider how he might
receive a premium on his Class B shares notwithstanding the charter
prohibition on such disparate distributions.129 In considering TMH’s offers,
the Delphi Board created a special committee comprised of only Class A
shareholders and a subcommittee that would make decisions with respect to
any matters related to Rosenkranz and differential merger consideration.130
Even though financial and legal advisors warned that disparate consideration would be “unusual and problematic,” Rosenkranz refused to accept the
122 See Steven M. Davidoff, What A.C.S. Settlement Means for Deal Litigation, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/what-acs-settlement-meansfor-deal-litigation.
123 Curtis J. Bacon et al., The Board of Directors and Dual-Class Recapitalizations, FIN. MGMT.,
Autumn 1997, at 5, 5.
124 C.A. No. 7144-VCG (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/
opinions/download.aspx?ID=169430.
125 Id. at 9.
126 Id. at 3.
127 Id. at 9.
128 Id. at 12.
129 Id. at 13-14.
130 Id. at 16-17.
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same price as the Class A stockholders.131 The sub-committee, afraid that
Rosenkranz would walk away from the deal, decided to accept his demand
for differential consideration.132 Ultimately, they agreed on $44.875 for Class
A stock and $53.875 for Class B stock.133
Rosenkranz got around the charter provision requiring equal consideration by conditioning his approval of the merger on a charter amendment
that would explicitly exclude this merger from the prohibition. 134 The
subcommittee found the charter amendment to be in the best interests of
the Class A stockholders, as it was the only way to enable the Class A
stockholders to obtain a substantial premium on their shares.135
Class A stockholders subsequently brought suit, attacking, in part, the
negotiations with respect to the differential consideration.136 They alleged
that Rosenkranz breached fiduciary and contractual obligations in seeking
the differential in the first instance.137 The court found that plaintiffs were
“reasonably likely to be able to demonstrate at trial that in negotiating for
disparate consideration and only agreeing to support the merger if he
received it, Rosenkranz violated duties to the stockholders.”138 While the
court did not grant the preliminary injunction sought by the shareholders,
the court noted that
[w]ith respect to the differential consideration, . . . any recovery in
damages will be on top of the amount at which the stockholders are
being asked to tender their shares. In light of all the issues raised
above, the stockholders have a fair if not perfect ability to decide
whether to tender their shares or seek appraisal rights under 8 Del.
C. § 262. 139

Delphi clearly illustrates that even with equal price provisions in place,
controlling shareholders may force public shareholders to jump through the
extra hoop of lengthy litigation in order to ensure enforcement of their
rights under the charter. It is doubtful that, at the time an investor purchases the stock of a dual-class company, he is able to properly incorporate the

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 46. The court reasoned that Rosenkranz could not bargain away his control premium through the corporate charter and then coerce it back after the fact. Id. at 43-44.
139 Id. at 54.

2014]

Disallowing Dual-Class Stock

1515

cost of such litigation into his evaluation of the stock price. The fact that
management wins—both during and after the existence of the dual-class
stock structure—further suggests that such companies should not be listed
on the nation’s stock exchanges.
III. CHANGE REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
To change the current rules on the listing of dual-class stock companies,
one might expect that the SEC, through its rulemaking powers, would be a
good place to start. However, the SEC has tried, unsuccessfully, to regulate
the exchanges’ policy in regards to dual-stock companies. In 1988, in
response to General Motors’ plan to issue two classes of stock—of which
one would have one-half vote per share—the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4,
which barred self-regulatory organizations from listing the stock of a
corporation that takes action “with the effect of nullifying, restricting or
disparately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing common
stockholders].”140 The D.C. Circuit found that, because the rule regulated
substantive matters of corporate governance, it exceeded the SEC’s authority
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.141 In light of this decision,
any change in policy to disallow companies with dual-class structures from
listing on the various U.S. stock exchanges would have to come either as a
collective decision from the stock exchanges themselves, or as a congressional mandate.
Realistically, unless the exchanges can come to a mutual agreement to
change their rules, only Congress will be able to compel a change in the
current policy. Because of difficulties in overcoming collective action
problems, any one exchange would likely be unwilling to make the first
move in disallowing dual-stock companies from listing on its exchange; for
example, once one exchange has implemented such a rule, other exchanges
will benefit from their increased appeal to dual-class companies seeking to
go public. Moreover, exchanges can alter their policies later on if such rules
are implemented voluntarily; a congressional mandate would both overcome
such problems and ensure that the exchanges continue to enforce the
prohibition on dual-class stock companies.

140 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
141 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (describing the regulation of self-regulatory organizations).
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CONCLUSION
If we accept the modern theory that the purpose of a corporation is to
maximize shareholder wealth, dual-class stock structures simply do not
make any sense. Empirical studies have found that when voting and economic rights are not proportionate, corporate funds are more likely to be
diverted to private benefits.142 Excess control rights drive up CEO compensation, incentivize unprofitable empire building, and increase the likelihood
that management will make shareholder value–destroying acquisitions.143
As one commentator ironically notes, “The advantage of a dual-class
share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the
demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share
structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands
of shareholders.”144
Even if the SEC did not place restrictions on dual-class stock in IPOs
because the process was not disenfranchising,145 the structure implicates
serious issues beyond voting rights. Dual-class structures run counter to
public policy because they weaken investor protections provided by the
market, exempt corporations from disclosure requirements that are otherwise required of single-class corporations, and lead to costly unifications and
litigation. Thus, they should be disallowed from listing on the U.S. stock
exchanges.

142 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J.
FIN. 1697, 1715 (2009).
143 Id. at 1722.
144 Andrew Hill, Enrolment Open for an MBA in Murdoch, FIN. TIMES ( J uly 18, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2fda9e8e-b176-11e0-9444-00144feab49a.html#axzz2IYIKmzDt.
145 See Ashton, supra note 12, at 876.

